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EVIDENCE-THE SOCIAL WORKER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE-COmmOn­
wealth v. Collell, 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1977, Massachusetts enacted a social worker-client privilege 
statute I which contained provisions similar to statutes recently en­
acted in nineteen other jurisdictions.2 In Commonwealth v. Collell,3 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rendered the first appel­
late interpretation of the statute. 
The defendant, in Collell, had been indicted for murder in the 
I. 	 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135 (West 1983), provides: 
No social worker in any licensed category, including tho~e in private prac­
tice, may disclose any information he may have acquired from persons consult­
ing him in his professional capacity except: 
(a) with the written consent of the person or, in the case of death or disability of 
his own personal representative, other person authorized to sue, or the benefici­
ary of an insurance policy on his life, health, or physical condition; 
(b) that a licensed certified social worker, including those engaged in independ­
ent clinical practice, licensed social worker, or licensed social work associate 
shall not be required to treat as confidential a communication that reveals the 
contemplation or commission of a crime or a harmful act; 
(c) when the person waives the privilege by bringing charges against the li­
censed certified social worker, including those engaged in independent clinical 
practice, the licensed social worker, or the licensed social work associate; 
(d) to initiate a proceeding under subsection C of section twenty-three of chap­
ter one hundred and nineteen or section twenty-four of chapter one hundred 
and nineteen or section three of chapter two hundred and ten and give testi­
mony in connection therewith; 
(e) In any other child custody case in which, upon a hearing in chambers, the 
judge, in the exercise of his discretion, determines that the social worker has 
evidence bearing significantly on the person's ability to provide suitable cus­
tody, and that it is more important to the welfare of the child that the informa­
tion be disclosed than that the relationship between the person and social 
worker be protected. 
2. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-2815 (Supp. 1983); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 101O-1Ol2 (West 
Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-63.5-115 (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 3913 
(Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 54-3213 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. III, § 6324 (Supp. 
1983-84); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-5360 (1977); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 335.170 (Bobbs­
Merrill 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2714(B) (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
32, § 7005 (Supp. 1983); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 339.1610 (Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. 
EVID. 509 (1983); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 59, § 1272.1 (West Supp. 1983-84); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.250 (1981); S.D. CODI­
FIED LAWS ANN. § 36-26-30 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-35-10 (1974); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 18, § 7101 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 8.01-400.2 (Supp. 1983). 
3. 	 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982). 
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second degree of his girl friend's seven-month-old child.4 A social 
worker, employed by the hospital where the injured child had been 
admitted, interviewed the defendant and others with regard to the 
cause of the child's injuries prior to the child's death.5 At a pretrial 
hearing the social worker, claiming a privilege6 under chapter 112, 
section 135 of the Massachusetts General Laws, refused to disclose 
fully, the information acquired from these interviews.7 The supreme 
judicial court granted the social worker's application for direct ap­
pellate review of both the scope of the social worker-client privilege 
and the scope of the exception to the privilege concerning "state­
ments revealing the commission of a crime or harmful act."8 
4. Id at 425, 439 N.E.2d at 1224. 
5. Id at 426, 439 N.E.2d at 1225. The social worker was assigned to treat the 
victim's family, which in cases of abuse would involve investigation into the cause of the 
child's injuries and would include interviews with family members, friends and others. 
The inclusion of social services by hospitals is seen as a necessary complement to total 
health care and in cases of child abuse and neglect provides early intervention for assess­
ment, treatment or referral according to the needs of the family. Gershenson, Child Mal­
treatment and the Federal Role, in CHILD ABUSE AND VIOLENCE 18,32-35 (D. Gil ed. 
1979); see also C. KEMPE & R. HELFER, THE BATTERED CHILD 280-85 (3d ed. 1980) 
[hereinafter cited as THE BATTERED CHILD, 3d ed.). 
6. 387 Mass. at 426, 439 N.E..2d at 1224. Although the privilege was asserted in 
Collett by the social worker, the protection is extended for the benefit of the social 
worker's clients and they are the actual owners of the privilege. The statutory grants of 
privilege for certain relationships that are valued by society require that the professional 
(social worker, physician, psychologist, or attorney) assert the privilege on behalf of the 
patient or client unless the privilege is waived by the owner, or is abrogated by an excep­
tion. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 72-73, at 152-53 (E. 
Cleary ed. 1972). 
7. 387 Mass. at 426, 439 N.E.2d at 1225. 
8. Id at 425, 439 N.E.2d at 1225. The supreme judicial court, although not re­
quested to do so by the lower court, also reviewed the procedure to be followed by a 
judge to determine whether the sought after information falls within the scope of the 
exception to the privilege. Id at 436, 439 N.E.2d at 1230. The court concluded that the 
in camera hearing was the appropriate procedure to determine which communications 
should be protected by the privilege but disapproved of the lower court's suggested inclu­
sion of the prosecutor and defense attorney at the hearing. Id at 438, 439 N.E.2d at 
1231. Although under common law the disclosure of information in the presence of a 
third party suggested that the communication was not intended to be confidential and no 
privilege would attach, MCCORMICK, supra note 6, §§ 91, 101, the use of the in camera 
hearing has become an an established procedure to evaluate the intended scope of all 
privileges. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-15 (1974) (district court judge was 
directed to isolate relevant and admissible evidence and return other privileged Presiden­
tial materials); Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 768-69, 364 N.E.2d 191,201­
02 (1977)(judicial procedure to evaluate privileged nature of statements made during a 
court ordered psychiatric examination). The disclosure of secrets to a judge in camera 
has not been challenged as a threat to confidential relationships, but rather, has been 
justified as benefiting the judicial process by promoting confidence that a privilege has 
not been abused. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 207 (1978). 
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The Massachusetts court's decision in Col/ell broadly construed 
the language of the statute with the result, as stated by the dissent, 
that "virtually all communications with social workers which occur 
during their performance of their duties must be found privileged 
... unless these communications fall within the exceptions."9 In 
addition, the court's interpretation of the exception to the privilege 
regarding criminal acts was narrowly construed and limited required 
disclosures to only those communications which "relate directly to 
the fact or immediate circumstances of a crime."10 This decision, 
therefore, offers the maximum protection for communications 
originating within the social worker-client relationship. The possi­
bility that this broad interpretation may provide a shield for perpe­
trators of crimes or harmful acts warrants inquiry into the 
fundamental bases \>f privileged communications. 
This note, in addition to analyzing the court's decision in Col­
lell, will review the drgins of the social worker-client privilege and 
the appellate decisions interpreting statutory provisions in several ju­
risdictions. A major focus of the note will be an application of the 
conditions fundamental to the establishment of any privilege. I I The 
note will conclude that although the analysis proposed is not man­
dated by precedent in Massachusetts, it is one that has been recog­
nized by numerous courts and commentators and, in the absence of 
clear evidence oflegislative intent, offers a reasonable alternative an­
alytical framework. Although the protection of privilege did not im­
pede the prosecution in Col/ell,12 the precedent set by this case may 
provide an unjustifiable shield of protection for perpetrators of 
crimes against children. 13 
II. FACTS OF COLLEIT 
On July 9, 1981, a seven-month-old child was admitted to the 
Massachusetts General Hospital unconscious, with multiple black 
and blue marks above the right temple. 14 The child never regained 
consciousness and died one week later. 15 . The autopsy report indi­
9. 387 Mass. at 441, 439 N.E.2d 1233 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
10. Id at 435, 439 N.E.2d at 1230. 
II. See infra notes 125-183 and accompanying text. 
12. Upon remand to the Suffolk Superior Court, the defendant was convicted of 
second degree murder. Commonwealth v. Collett, No. 036178 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 
1982). 
13. See infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text. 
14. Commonwealth's Brief on Report from the Superior Court Department of the 
Trial Court at 3-4, Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982). 
IS. Commonwealth's Brief, supra note 14, at 4. 
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cated that "there were several bruises estimated to be about one 
week old around the head. The cause of death was cerebral edema 
and a subdural hematoma inflicted by blunt force to the head."16 
During the week of the child's admission, a licensed social 
worker employed by the hospital was assigned to treat the child's 
familyP The social worker, as required by the child abuse and ne­
glect mandated reporting statute,18 notified the Department of Social 
Services that the injuries sustained by the child were consistent with 
abuse. 19 Prior to the child's death, the social worker interviewed the 
child's mother, other relatives, and the defendant.20 
As required by statute,21 the child's death resulting from the in­
juries allegedly inflicted by the defendant, was reported to the medi­
cal examiner and the district attorney. The social worker, when 
called upon to testify before the Suffolk County Grand Jury, dis­
closed that "during an interview with the defendant, he admitted to 
her that he hit the victim on the night she was hospitalized and had 
also hit her in the past."22 The social worker, claiming a privilege 
under chapter 112, section 135 of the Massachusetts General Laws,23 
refused to disclose additional communications "that concerned[ed] 
the child's appearance and behavior prior to her hospitalization and 
the feelings, observations, suspicions and hopes [that the defendant 
and the child's relatives held] about the child and one another."24 In 
16. Id. A subdural hematoma in infants is a serious life threatening head injury 
which has recently been shown to occur almost exclusively as a result of intentional in­
fliction by parents or caretakers. Helfer, Slovis, & Black, Injuries Resulting When Small 
Children Fall Out ofBed, 60 PEDIATRICS 533-35 (1977). 
17. Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 426,439 N.E.2d 1233, 1225 (1982). 
18. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 1983)(requires physicians, 
nurses and other medical personnel, educators, counselors, probation officers, social 
workers, foster parents and police who have cause to believe that a child has been abused 
or neglected to report the information to the Department of Social Services and failure to 
make the required report is punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars). 
19. Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 426, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1225 (1982). 
See supra note 16. 
20. Collett, 387 Mass. at 426, 439 N.E.2d at 1225. 
21. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 1983). The statue, in addi­
tion to the mandated reporting requirements, supra note 18, requires that any death that 
may be attributed to child abuse or neglect must be reported to the district attorney as 
well as to the Department of Social Services. This reporting mandate was recently ex­
panded in Massachusetts to require that all serious injuries and incidents of sexual abuse 
also must be reported to the district attorney. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51B 
(West Supp. 1983), amended by MASS. GEN. LAWS, S. Doc. No. 2064 (Aug. 13, 1983). 
See infra note 88. 
22. Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 426, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1225 (1982). 
23. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135 (West Supp. 1983-84). 
24. Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 426, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1225 (1982). 
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addition, the social worker refused to reveal "statements made [to 
the social worker] by the defendant allegedly denying any wrongdo­
ing."25 The defendant was indicted by the grand jury for second 
degree murder.26 
At a pretrial hearing, the superior court judge ordered the social 
worker to disclose "all of the alleged communications"27 at an in 
camera hearing.28 The social worker refused to comply with the or­
der and requested and was granted direct appellate review.29 
In Collett, the supreme judicial court was requested to define to 
whom the social worker-client privilege extends as well as the scope 
of the exception to the privilege with regard to the commission of a 
crime or harmful act. 30 The majority in Collett, relying on the broad 
purpose of the legislation and the legislative history of the bill,31 as 
well as a limited comparison with the statutes and opinions in other 
jurisdictions,32 held, inter alia, that the social worker's privilege 
under the statute,33 includes communications from all persons con­
sulting the social worker in his or her professional capacity, regard­
less of whether such persons are clients of the social worker.34 In 
addition, the court concluded that the exception to the privilege for 
communications revealing the contemplation of a crime or harmful 
act was to be narrowly construed and did not require disclosure of 
all relevant information, but would be limited to only those commu­
nications which relate directly to the commission or immediate cir­
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 435, 439 N.E.2d at 1224. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. See supra note 8. 
29. Collett, 387 Mass. at 425, 439 N.E.2d at 1225; see supra note 8. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 429, 439 N.E.2d at 1227. The supreme judicial court compared the lan­
guage of the enacted version of the social worker-client privilege statute, Massachusetts 
General Laws ch. 112, section 135, see supra note I for text of the statute, with two earlier 
versions of the statute, MASS. LEGIS. DOCUMENTS, H. 4877 (1971) and H. 1997 (1972), 
which were not passed by the legislature. The court's analysis of these provisions is 
presented later in this note. See infra notes 81-83, 101-06 and accompanying text. Each 
year from 1971 to 1977, the legislature has considered bills for the licensing of social 
workers, all of which contained a provision protecting confidential communications be­
tween social workers and their clients. See MASS. LEGIs. DOCUMENTS, H. 5351 (1973), 
H. 1306 (1974), H. 2917 (1975), H. 872 (1976), H. 4884 (1976). H. 2383 (1977). S. 463 
(1977). S. 1693 (1977). These bills were not considered by the supreme judicial court in 
Collett possibly because of their similarity to either the 1971 and 1972 bills or to the 
enacted bill. For this reason. these provisions will not be discussed in this note. 
32. Commonwealth v. Collett. 387 Mass. 424. 439-30. 439 N.E.2d 1223. 1227 
(1982). 
33. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112. § 135 (West 1983). 
34. Collett, 387 Mass. at 430, 439 N.E.2d at 1227. 
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cumstances of a crime or harmful act. 35 
III. BACKGROUND 
The foundation of adjudication of civil and criminal disputes 
rests upon the requirement that the most reliable sources of informa­
tion be presented to the triers of fact and law.36 The availability of 
all reliable relevant testimonial evidence is guaranteed to litigants by 
our system of justice which considers every person to be under a 
duty to appear to testify upon proper subpoena, and to reveal 
whatever he or she knows upon questioning as to the truth of the 
subject of inquiry.37 A number of doctrines have evolved under 
common law, however, which render certain types of evidence inad­
missible because they are unreliable,38 irrelevant,39 or protected from 
disclosure by a grant of privilege.40 While the exclusion of unrelia­
ble or irrelevant evidence promotes the determination of the facts, 
the rules of privilege serve to obstruct the path to truth.41 
A common law or statutory grant of a testimonial privilege from 
forced disclosure of information which would otherwise be admissi­
ble, insures that the holder of a privilege may invoke its protection 
and refuse to answer questions in court without the risk of judicial 
sanctions or contempt proceedings.42 As noted by Dean McCor­
mick, testimonial privileges are condoned by our system of justice 
because they serve to protect special interests and relationships 
which "are regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify some 
incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the administration 
of justice."43 Thus, in a system of justice which guarantees all liti­
gants a fair trial and promotes the ascertainment of the truth,44 any 
35. Id at 435, 439 N.E.2d at 1230. 
36. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 20. 
37. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 
U.S. 273, 281-82 (1919). 
38. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 10, at 20-22 (Testimonial evidence offered as 
proof under common law must be based on first hand knowledge or may be inadmissible 
under the hearsay or opinion rules.). 
39. Id at 433-41 (evidence which is not applicable or supportive of the fact or issue 
to be proved). 
40. See infta notes 46-49 and accompanying text. 
41. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 151-52. 
42. See id at 151-60. See also R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 588-602 
(3d ed. 1982); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2194a (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
43. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 152. 
44. The rights to counsel, a speedy and public trial by jury, an opportunity to con­
front witnesses and compulsory process to obtain favorable witnesses are guaranteed to 
litigants by the sixth amendment. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 568. 
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grant of privilege must be carefully scrutinized for it will impede the 
determination of the facts_45 
The concept of privilege originated at common law in the six­
teenth century but was granted only to the attorney-client relation­
ship.46 Today, testimonial privileges are created primarily by statute 
and extend to a number of relationships including husband-wife, 
clergy-penitent, physician-patient, psychologist-patient, accountant­
client, journalist-informant, and social worker-client.47 The grant of 
a privilege is a legislative or judicial recognition that in some circum­
stances the judicial policy of seeking full disclosure must yield to 
competing policy concerns which favor confidentiality.48 Testimo­
nial privileges are not absolute, however, and, although the scope of 
applicability of any privilege varies widely from one jurisdiction to 
the next, all statutory privileges reflect a legislative balancing of 
competing policy concerns and deny the protection of privilege in 
the presence of an overriding state interest.49 
IV. ANALYSIS: THE SOCIAL WORKER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
In Collett ,50 the supreme judicial court interpreted the provi­
sions of the recently enacted social worker-client privilege statute. 
The broadly-worded statute required the court to look beyond the 
language of the statute to ascertain the intent of the legislature. 51 In 
the absence of recorded legislative history, however, the legislative 
intent ascribed by a court to a promulgated law is, at best, an opin­
ion as to the most probable of several possible interpretations. 52 The 
court in Collett based its interpretation on the presumed purpose of 
45. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)("Whatever their origins, these 
exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expan­
sively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth."). See also WIGMORE, 
supra note 42, § 2192, at 73. 
46. WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 2290, at 542-45. 
47. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 156-60. McCormick notes some exceptions to 
the general rule for the statutory creation of privileges. Id at 156 n. 32. See also Allred 
v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976)(common law recognition of psychotherapist testimo­
nial privilege). 
48. See WIGMORE, supra note 42, at §§ 2196, 2285, 2286; MCCORMIcK,supra note 
6, at 151-52. 
49. Collell, 387 Mass. at 428, 439 N.E.2d at 1226; see generally MCCORMICK, supra 
note 6, at 156-60. 
50. 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982). 
51. See generally MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 4, § 6 (Michie/Law. Coop. 1980)(rules for 
construing statutes). . 
52. See Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: A Peek into the Mind and Will of a 
Legislature, 50 IND. L. REV. 206 (1975). 
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the enactment,53 the legislative history of the bill,54 and a considera­
tion of similar provisions as interpreted by courts in other jurisdic­
tions.55 Although there are few appellate opinions interpreting 
social worker-client privilege statutes, a comparison of similarities 
and distinctions among several jurisdictions reveals some of the al­
ternative interpretations available to the court in Collett. 
A. Scope ofthe privilege 
In most jurisdictions, the language defining the scope of the so­
cial worker-client privilege is worded broadly, implying that all com­
munications originating within the context of the protected 
relationship must be held in confidence. Although the language uti­
lized varies widely from one jurisdiction to the next, most statutes 
forbid the disclosure of information acquired frompersons consulting 
the social worker in his professional capacity, 56 or in some instances 
limit the application of the privilege to a client relationship.57 A few 
jurisdictions have a more specific limitation, however, and require 
that the communications originate within a therapeutic setting.58 
New Mexico's provision is unique in that it extends the privilege 
only to those relationships arising pursuant to an allegation that a 
child is delinquent or in need of supervision.59 Under the New Mex­
ico provision, only the child, parent, guardian or custodian may 
claim the privilege.60 Statutes containing highly specific language, 
such as those requiring a therapeutic relationship,61 clearly define the 
intent of the legislature and, therefore, limit judicial discretion in 
cases requiring interpretation of such provisions.62 The intent of the 
legislature is much less clear, however, in statutory provisions which 
53. 387 Mass. at 427, 439 N.E.2d at 1226; see infra text accompanying note Ill. 
54. 387 Mass. at 429-30, 439 N.E.2d at 1227; see infra notes 82-83, 102-107 and 
accompanying text. 
55. 387 Mass. at 429-31,439 N.E.2d at 1227-28. 
56. Eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 3913 (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-5360 
(1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. ll2, § 135 (West 1983). 
57. Eg., MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 339.1610 (West Supp. 1983-84); N.Y. CIV. 
PRAC. LAW § 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.250 (1981). 
58. Eg., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1010-1012 (West Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 335.170 (Bobbs-Merrill 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2714B (West 1974). 
59. N.M. R. EVID. 509. 
60. Id. 
61. See supra note 58. 
62. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 4, § 6 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980); Corcoran V. S.S. 
Kresge Co., 313 Mass. 299, 303, 47 N.E.2d 257, 259 (1943) ("if the words of the statute 
are clear and explicit, there is no room for speculation"). 
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extend the privilege to persons consulting the social worker in his pro­
fessional capacity or to the social worker's client. 
At least two courts have addressed ambiguous language in the 
portion of the social worker-client statute which defines the applica­
ble scope of the privilege.63 In People v. Lipsky,64 the defendant had 
disclosed to a social worker information concerning his involvement 
in a homicide. The New York court, in order to determine whether 
the privilege was applicable, was required to interpret the statute 
which provided, in pertinent part, that a "social worker. . . shall not 
be required to disclose a communication made by his client to 
him...."65 The court concluded, inter alia, that although the so­
cial worker had interviewed the defendant under a court-ordered 
evaluation prior to sentencing for an offense in another jurisdiction, 
there was "no indication that the defendant was the client of [the 
social worker]."66 The court reasoned that "[t]he mere circum­
stances [sic] that [the social worker] ... was interviewing the de­
fendant [did] not in and of itself establish a client relationship. The 
defendant made disclosures during the initial interview. There was 
no advice given or program planned."67 Thus, the New York court 
seemed to indicate that not all disclosures made to a social worker 
would fall within the scope of the privilege, but inferred that perhaps 
a counseling or therapeutic requirement was necessary to justify ex­
tension of the privilege. 
The Supreme Court of South Dakota demonstrated a similar 
inclination to limit the applicable scope of the social worker privi­
lege. In State v. Martin ,68 the court reviewed a statutory provision 
which stated, in pertinent part, that "[n]o ... social worker . . . 
may disclose any information he may have acquired from persons 
consulting him in his professional capacity that was necessary to en­
able him to render services in his professional capacity to those per­
sons. . . ."69 The court concluded, inter alia, that this language 
63. People v. Lipsky, 102 Misc. 2d 19, 423 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1979); State v. Martin, 
274 N.W.2d 893 (S.D. 1979), cerl. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979). 
64. 102 Misc. 2d 19,423 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1979). 
65. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83)(emphasis supplied). 
66. Lipsky, 102 Misc. 2d at 24, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 602 (emphasis supplied). 
67. Id. The court in addition noted that the social worker did not meet the licens­
ing requirements under New York's education law, N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 7704 (McKinney 
1972 & Supp. 1982-83), nor did the defendant have any explicit assurance of confidenti­
ality from the social worker. Lipsky, 102 Misc. 2d at 24, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 602-03. An 
implicit or explicit assurance of confidentiality is considered an essential element to jus­
tify the extension of a privilege. See infra notes 131-51 and accompanying text. 
68. 274 N.W.2d 893 (S.D. 1979). 
69. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-26-30 (19J7)(emphasis supplied). 
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indicated a legislative intent "to require inquiry into the facts and 
circumstances in each case,"70 and although the social worker had 
treated the defendant for a period of six to eight months, the defend­
ant's conversations disclosing the commission of a crime did not fall 
within the scope of the privilege.71 The court in Martin noted that 
there were fundamental conditions that must be met to justify the 
extension of a privilege. The court reasoned that because the de­
fendant had no assurance or expectation of confidentiality, there was 
no basis for the extension of the protection.72 In addition, the court 
noted that "the conversations offered in this case did not relate to 
anything material to and did not arise out of their specific relation­
ship."73 Thus, even though the social worker and the defendant had 
established a relationship which would appear to be within the scope 
of the privilege, the South Dakota court was not willing to give the 
statute such a broad interpretation. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court faced comparably 
ambiguous statutory language in Commonwealth v. Collett. 74 The 
court was requested to interpret the scope of the social worker-client 
privilege statute which provided, in pertinent part, that "[n]o social 
worker . . . may disclose any information he may have acquired 
from persons consulting him in his professional capacity."75 The 
court rejected the Commonwealth's suggestion that the statute 
should apply only "when a professional relationship exists between a 
social worker and a client,"76 and reasoned that in a case of sus­
pected child abuse a social worker, in the course of rendering serv­
ices, would be expected to communicate "with members of the 
70. Martin, 274 N.W.2d at 895. 
71. Id at 896. 
72. Id The court in Lipsky also recognized that an assurance or expectation of 
confidentiality was basic to the establishment of a privilege. The New York court noted 
that the defendant had been informed that "there would be no confidentiality if the mat­
ter [he voluntarily disclosed] involved a capital offense." People v. Lipsky, 102 Misc. 2d 
19, 24, 423 N.Y.S.2d 599, 601 (1979). 
73. State v. Martin, 274 N.W.2d 893, 896 (S.D. 1979). The appellant in Marlin 
argued that his admission to his psychiatric social worker in a telephone conversation 
that he had killed someone was privileged under South Dakota law. Id at 895 (citing 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-26-30 (1977». The state argued that because one of the 
social worker's concerns subsequent to the conversation was that the defendant might 
commit suicide, the conversation was not privileged because it fell within the scope of the 
exception for communications revealing the contemplation of "a harmful act". The 
court, however, found it unnecessary to rule on this issue. Id 
74. 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982). 
75. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135 (West 1983), see supra note I for full 
text of the statute. 
76. Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 428, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (1982). 
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victim's family and others closely connected to the victim's home 
situation."77 The court concluded that because the social worker 
had spoken with the defendant and members of the victim's family 
during the course of her professional employment, these individuals 
would be entitled to claim the privilege.78 The supreme judicial court 
acknowledged the narrow interpretation given to the scope of the 
privilege by the courts in Lipsky79 and Martin,80 but distinguished 
the instant case because the Massachusetts statute did not contain 
language restricting the scope of the privilege to the social worker's 
client.81 The majority opinion in Collett noted that a client qualifica­
tion was contained in earlier versions of the statute which had not 
been enacted,82 but since this limitation was not included in the en­
acted version, the court concluded it was therefore not necessary to 
make this distinction in determining the scope of the privilege.83 
The majority opinion offered no additional support for this conclu­
sion. Justice Lynch, in dissent, however, maintained that the court's 
conclusion was overly broad in that it extended the protection to all 
communications with social workers regardless of "whether third 
parties [were] present, or assurances of confidentiality [had] been 
made,84 unless these communications [fell] within the [exceptions to 
77. Id. at 429, 439 N.E.2d at 1227. 
78. Id. 
79. 102 Misc. 2d 19,423 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1979); see supra notes 64-67 and accompa­
nying text. 
80. 274 N.W.2d 893 (S.D. 1979). cerl. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979), see supra notes 
68-73 and accompanying text. 
8!. Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 429-30, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1227 
(1982). 
82. Id. at 430, 439 N.E.2d at 1227. Earlier versions of the statute provided, in 
pertinent part, that: "No. . . social worker. . . may disclose any information he may 
have acquired from persons consulting him in his professional capacity Ihal was necessary 
10 enable him 10 render services in his professional capacity 10 Ihose persons." MASS. 
LEGIS. DOCUMENTS, H. 4877 (1971) and H. 1997 (1972)(emphasis supplied). Statutory 
language which restricts the scope of the social worker-client privilege, similar to the 
earlier versions of the Massachusetts statute, has been adopted in several jurisdictions. 
E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. Ill, § 6324 (Supp. 1983-84); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, 
§ 7005 (Supp. 1983). 
83. 387 Mass. at 430, 439 N.E.2d at 1227. 
84. Justice Lynch offered this criticism of the majority opinion based on the com­
mon law requirement of confidentiality as a prerequisite to a claim of privilege. If disclo­
sures are made in the presence of a casual third person, under common law, they will not 
be considered confidential, and thus, no privilege will attach. If the third person is "pres­
ent as a needed and customary participant in the consultation," however, the "circle of 
confidence" will be widened to include that person, and the privilege will be preserved. 
MCCORMICK supra note 6, at 216. McCormick notes that close family members or a 
physician's assistant would be examples of third persons who would not violate the confi­
dentiality requirement. Id. at 216-17. The social work profession has suggested that this 
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the privilege]."85 
The broad interpretation of the scope of the privilege by the 
majority in Collett has potentially far reaching implications for fu­
ture cases of child abuse and neglect. Like many other states, Mas­
sachusetts has historically favored a policy of rehabilitation86 rather 
than prosecution of perpetrators of child abuse and neglect. This 
policy is based on the theory that criminal prosecution may not only 
reinforce the psychological traits which were responsible for the 
harmful conduct, but also may serve to destroy the integrity of the 
family and thereby cause additional injury to the child.87 But in 
cases of serious injury or death this rationale collapses and prosecu­
tion is warranted.88 
"circle of confidence" extends not only to all participants in "group therapy," but in some 
instances to a whole network of "significant persons" who make up what is referred to as 
a "client system." Iaccarino, Privileged Communications in Social Work, SOCIAL 
CASEWORK 367, 370 (1980). See infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text. 
85. 387 Mass. 424, 441, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1233 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
86. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § I (West Supp. 1983-84), which provides 
in pertinent part: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of this commonwealth to direct 
its efforts, first, to the strengthening and encouragement of family life for the protection 
and care of children; [and] to assist and encourage the use by any family of all available 
resources to this end ..." See also People v. Abrams, 73 Misc. 2d 534, 536, 341 
N.Y.S.2d 515, 518 (1973) (Interpreting the New York Family Court Act, the court stated, 
"offenses arising from family conflict·should be weighed initially by the family court with 
the view of counseling and preserving the family unit."). 
87. Grumet, The Plaintive Plaint(jft: Victims of the Ballered Child Syndrome, 4 
FAM. L.Q. 296, 307-313 (1970)(prosecution is undesirable and ineffective because it infre­
quently results in conviction, increases hostility toward the child and therefore, repeated 
abuse, and in addition is likely to cause parents to resist treatment); see also Steele & 
Pollock, A Psychiatric Study of Parents Who Abuse Infants and Small Children in R. 
HELFER & C. KEMPE, THE BATTERED CHILD 124-31 (2d ed. 1974)(reporting the effec­
tiveness of psychotherapy for rehabilitation of abusive parents); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. 
FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 24-25 (1979)[herein­
after cited as BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS](Not only will parental hostility be increased 
by intrusion into the family, it will also cause reactions by the effected children such as 
"anxiety, diminishing trust, loosening of emotional ties, or an increasing tendency to be 
out of control."). 
88. Even advocates who give great deference to the primacy of family integrity and 
thus promote a policy of minimum state intervention, agree that when serious injuries are 
inflicted by parents, rehabilitative efforts are not likely to be successful in regard to the 
damaged parent-child relationship. As stated by these authorities, "[p]arental maltreat­
ment leaves psychological scars which endure long beyond any physical healing and pre­
clude a child from regaining the feeling of being safe, wanted, and cared for in the 
parents' presence." BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 87, at 73. See also J. 
Howell, The Role ofLaw Enforcement in the Prevention, Investigation, and Treatment of 
Child Abuse in THE BATTERED CHILD, 3d ed., supra note 5, at 306-15. 
The Massachusetts legislature has recently indicated a change in policy in the man­
agement of child abuse and neglect cases by a recent enactment which requires the De­
partment of Social Services to notify the district attorney in all cases in which a child is 
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The prosecution of perpetrators of abuse and neglect, however, 
is often impeded by the nature of the act itself. Crimes against chil­
dren most often occur within the privacy of the home, witnessed only 
by other members of the household.89 Direct testimonial evidence, 
therefore, is rarely available and the prosecution may be forced to 
rely primarily on expert testimony to establish both the cause of the 
inflicted injury and the party responsible for its infliction.90 A social 
worker, as an expert in family relations, may be one of the few wit­
nesses available to the prosecution who has relevant, admissible evi­
dence in the case.91 Thus, a broadly defined social worker-client 
privilege may render expert, relevant testimony inadmissible and 
will impede investigation and prosecution of cases in which children 
have been seriously injured. As a result, those with tendencies to 
inflict such injuries may be allowed to continue the inappropriate 
behavior without criminal sanction. 
In Collett,92 although the protection for communications be-
seriously injured, raped, or sexually abused or exploited, in addition to those instances 
which result in death. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 5lB(West Supp. 1983-84), 
amended by MASS. GEN. LAWS, S. Doc. No. 2064 (Aug. 13, 1983). This bill was promul­
gated in response to numerous serious child abuse cases and the subsequent death of a 
number of the victims which occurred within several months at the beginning of 1983. 
The Middlesex County grand jury, in what was considered a highly unusual occurrence, 
issued an advisory statement which criticized the use of the social worker-client privilege 
noting that the assertion of privilege was obstructing the successful intervention and 
prosecution of these cases and called upon the legislature to remedy the situation. The 
Boston Globe, Mar. 5, 1983, at 17, col. 5-6. The new reporting requirement abrogates the 
social worker-client privilege for social workers employed by the state's Department of 
Social Services and requires that all information obtained during the investigation of 
specified cases be made available to the district attorney. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
119, § 51B (West Supp. 1983-84), amended by MASS. GEN. LAWS, S. Doc. No. 2064 (Aug. 
13, 1983). 
89. Note, Evidentiary Problems in Criminal Child Abuse Prosecutions, 63 GEO. L.J. 
257 (1974); D. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 118-22 (1970). 
90. Note, supra note 89, at 271-73. 
91. Although medical expert testimony is most frequently relied upon to diagnose 
the cause of a serious injury or death, see Note, supra note 89, at 272-73, in some in­
stances the differential diagnosis of an injury may be uncertain, and on these occasions 
the testimony of a social worker who has interviewed family members may be vital to the 
disposition of the case. As an expert witness a social worker would "be permitted to 
testify not just to facts within [her or his) knowledge as most witnesses must, but to opin­
ions concerning those facts and to hypothetical situations as well." L. SCHROEDER, THE 
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF SOCIAL WORK 73 (1982). See also In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 
382,386,402 A.2d 169, 172 (1979). The New Hampshire court in a custody proceeding 
held that testimony of a mental health therapist and a physician was not privileged in 
cases of child abuse or neglect. The court stated, "[t)he best information available to the 
court concerning past and future parental behavior is often the testimony of treating 
physicians, psychologists, and social and mental-health workers." Id 
92. 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982). 
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tween the social worker and other family members fell within the 
scope of the state's interest in rehabilitation, this policy cannot be 
expanded to justify protection for communications between the so­
cial worker and the defendant, who had no biological or psychologi­
cal relationship to the child.93 If, in the instant case, the defendant 
had not admitted his guilt to the social worker, which she was re­
quired to disclose under the exception to the privilege,94 the prosecu­
tion may have been left with evidence that a crime had been 
committed but insufficient evidence to gain an indictment. A narrow 
reading of the scope of the privilege limiting the protection to the 
social worker's primary clients, or intended beneficiaries of the social 
services95 would avoid the likelihood of this result. 
B. Scope oj'the Exception for Crimes or Harmful Acts 
The exceptions to a statutory grant of privilege reflect a legisla­
tive concern for competing interests that society considers of overrid­
ing significance and which thus serve to abrogate the privilege in 
certain instances.96 Almost all jurisdictions abrogate the social 
worker-client privilege for communications that reveal the contem­
plation of a crime or harmful act,97 but only a few states also abro­
gate the privilege for communications that reveal the commission of 
a crime or harmful act.98 Although the Massachusetts statute99 does 
not clearly define which communications the legislature intended to 
exempt from the protection of the privilege, the admissions by the 
defendant in Co/lell ioo that he had hit the child on several occasions 
prior to her death,lOl unquestionably fell within the scope of the ex­
ception and, therefore, were subject to compelled disclosure.102 All 
93. If the defendant had developed a psychological bond with the child it could 
then be argued that he should be included as a member of the child's family. See gener­
ally BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 87, at 40-46. 
94. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135(b) (West 1983), see supra note I for text 
of the statute. 
95. See infra notes 153-65 and accompanying text. 
96. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 428, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1226. See infra notes 173-82. 
97. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-2815(b) (Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 
36-26-30(2) (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-35-10(2) (1974). 
98. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 3913(2) (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 54­
3213(2) (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 6324(1) (Supp. 1983-84); !UN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 75-5360(b) (1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135(b) (West Supp. 1983); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1272.1(3) (West Supp. 1983-84). 
99. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135(b) (West 1983), see supra note I for text 
of the statute. 
100. 387 Mass. 424,439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982). 
101. Id. at 426. 439 N.E.2d at 1225. 
102. Id. at 431-32. 439 N.E.2d at 1228. 
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other communications to the social worker by the defendant and 
others, however, which related to the child's injury and subsequent 
death, as well as statements by the defendant suggestive of a con­
sciousness of guilt, 103 were held to be outside the scope of the excep­
tion and not subject to disclosure. I04 
The majority in Collett reached this conclusion based substan­
tially on the legislative history of the enactment. 105 The court noted 
that earlier versions of the statute contained the exception now in­
corporated in subsection (b) 106 and in addition provided an excep­
tion which required a social worker to testify fully if the information 
acquired indicated that a "child was the victim of a felony or needed 
care and protection."107 The "textual differences" between the ear­
lier versions of the statute and the enacted version, the court con­
cluded' "seem to indicate that the legislature chose not to require a 
social worker to testify fully . . . even when the crime involved a 
minor." 108 In addition, the court noted, the statute had been 
amended in 1981 109 and again, the legislature had failed to include 
an exception for crimes or harmful acts against minors. I 10 The court 
offered further support for a narrow reading of the scope of the ex­
ception based on the assumed objectives of the statute. The court 
stated: 
103. Id at 432, 439 N.E.2d at 1228. The Commonwealth sought disclosure by the 
social worker of communications with "the defendant and others concerning the child's 
appearance and behavior prior to her hospitalization and the feelings, observations, sus­
picions and hopes that the defendant and others interviewed held about the child and 
one another," id , as well as communications with the defendant "denying any wrongdo­
ing." Id at 426, 439 N.E.2d at 1225. These communications, the Commonwealth ar­
gued, "reveal the commission of a crime," and a "consciousness of guilt," and therefore, 
are excepted under the statute. Id at 432, 439 N.E.2d at 1228. 
104. Id at 435-36, 439 N.E.2d at 1230. 
105. Id at 433-34, 439 N.E.2d at 1229. 
\06. Id (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135(b)(West 1983), see supra 
note I for text of statute). 
\07. MASS. LEGIS. DOCUMENTS, H. 4877 (1971) and H. 1997 (1972), provided in 
pertinent part, that: 
No ... social worker ... may disclose any information he may have ac­
quired from persons consulting him in his professional capacity ... except: 
(3) Where the person is a child under sixteen years of age and the informa­
tion acquired by the ... social worker indicated that the child was the victim 
of a felony or needed care and protection . . . the. . . social worker may be 
required to testify fully in relation thereto. . . 
\08. 387 Mass. at 433, 439 N.E.2d at 1229. 
109. Id at 434, 439 N.E.2d at 1229. The 1981 amendment to the statute added 
exceptions to the privilege for communications with a social worker arising pursuant to 
care and protection or custody proceedings. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135 (d)(e) 
(West 1983). 
1\0. 387 Mass. at 433, 439 N.E.2d at 1229. 
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The first objective [of the statute] is to encourage individuals in 
need of help from a social worker to seek that help by ensuring the 
confidentiality of their communications. The second objective, 
embodied in subsection (b), is to serve the interests of society in 
prosecuting those who are guilty of criminal conduct. In enacting 
subsection (b) the Legislature attempted to balance these two 
objectives. I I I 
Based on the purpose of the legislation and the prior history of 
the statute, the court held that a narrow reading of the exception was 
warranted. Such a reading, therefore, only would require disclosure 
by a social worker of "communications which relate directly to the 
fact or immediate circumstances of a crime." I 12 
Legislative history that does not clearly express the intent of the 
legislature, however, by its nature, yields a subjective rather than an 
objective result. l13 The court has broad discretion to choose what it 
considers the best of several possible alternative meanings. The leg­
islative history of the social worker privilege statute was reviewed by 
the court in Collett to determine the intended meaning of the re­
cently enacted version. There are, however, several alternative 
interpretations. 
The legislature's use of broad language in exception (b), which 
abrogates the privilege for communications which reveal the commis­
sion of a crime as well as those which reveal the contemplation of a 
crime, could suggest an intent to restrict the use of the privilege in all 
criminal cases. 114 Because a majority of jurisdictions abrogate the 
privilege only for communications that reveal the contemplation of a 
crime, 115 the additional language could be interpreted as an indica­
tion of a greater interest by the legislature in prosecuting perpetra­
tors of crime rather than protecting the confidences disclosed to 
social workers. A New York court construing a more narrow version 
of this exception 116 believed that it was unlikely that the legislature 
intended the social worker privilege to protect criminal acts" 7 and, 
Ill. Id. at 434-35, 439 N.E.2d at 1230. 
112. Id. at 435, 439 N.E.2d at 1230. 
113. See genera/Iy Dickerson, supra note 52; Note, Non/egis/ative Intent as an Aid to 
Statutory Interpretation, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 676 (1949). 
114. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135(b) (West 1983), see supra note I for 
text of the statute. 
115. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
116. N.Y. CIv. hAC. LAW § 4508(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83) ("a certified social 
worker shall not be required to treat as confidential a communication. . . which reveals 
the contemplation of a crime ...."). 
117. People v. O'Gorman, 91 Misc. 2d 539, 541, 398 N.Y.S.2d 336, 338 (1977)(de­
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therefore, rejected a narrow interpretation of the exception. I IS 
A second possible interpretation of exception (b) is based on the 
change of words from the earlier versions of the statute to the present 
provision. The 1971 and 1972 bills abrogated the privilege for "com­
munications that reveal ... a felony or harmful act," 119 whereas, 
the enacted bill expanded the exception by substituting the word 
crime for the word felony .120 The court in Collett 121 did not discuss 
this discrepancy between the earlier and the later versions of the stat­
ute. In addition, although the legislature did not include an excep­
tion for situations in which a child is the victim of a crime, it is 
plausible that they assumed that the extra provision would be redun­
dant, since exception (b) could be read to extend to all victims of 
crimes or harmful acts, including children. Thus, there is a possibil­
ity that a different focus by the court in Collett would have led to a 
broader reading of the exception and required the disclosure of all 
communications concerning the circumstances of the child's 
death. 122 
The result of the supreme judicial court's interpretation of the 
social worker-client privilege statute is that future perpetrators of 
crimes against children who divulge information to a social worker 
will be provided maximum protection for all communications. This 
result may frequently be unjustifiable, particularly in cases where the 
perpetrator of a crime against a child will be allowed to invoke the 
privilege even though he or she is unrelated to the child, has no psy­
chological or other relationship to the family, and did not seek the 
advice or opinion of the social worker. Although the majority in 
Collett 123 seemed to share a New York court's concern that the ex­
ception abrogating the privilege was "not intended as a 'shield be­
fendant's misrepresentations on a social service application not protected by statutory 
privilege). 
118. Id. at 542, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 338. The court in O'Gorman affirmed a principle 
from an earlier case: "[T]he seal of personal confidence can never be used to cover a 
transaction which is in itself a crime." Id. (quoting People v. Farmer, 194 N.Y. 251, 269, 
87 N.E. 457, 464 (1909». 
119. MASS. LEGIS. DOCUMENTS, H. 4877 (1971) and H. 1997 (1972) provide in 
pertinent part, that a "social worker shall not be required to treat as confidential a com­
munication that reveals the contemplation or commission of ale/ony or harmful act to 
oneself or others." (Emphasis supplied). 
120. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135(b) (West 1983), see supra note I for 
text of statute. 
121. 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982). 
122. See supra note 103. 
123. 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223. 
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hind which the commission of a homicide would be sheltered,' "124 
ironically, the court's conclusion may allow this result. The dearth 
of case law interpreting social worker privilege statutes in addition to 
the lack of recorded legislative history in Massachusetts concededly 
imposed a difficult task upon the court in Collett. Had the court 
applied the alternative approach, as suggested by the dissent, it may 
have reached a more narrow definition of the scope of the privilege 
which would have limited the extension of privilege in cases of 
crimes against children. 
V. SUGGESTED ANALYSIS 
The most widely recognized standard for evaluating the exten­
sion of a privilege to a relationship was established by Dean Wig­
more. 125 According to Wigmore, four conditions must be satisfied in 
order to justify the use of privilege to prevent forced disclosure of 
communications originating within one of society'S valued 
relationships. 126 
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that 
they will not be disclosed. 
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full 
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. 
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the 
community ought to be sedulously fostered. 
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by disclosure 
of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby 
gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 127 
Wigmore noted that few relationships, such as attorney-client, 
husband-wife, and informer-government, are able to meet these cri­
teria and are, therefore, valid privileges. 128 Wigmore considered 
other privileges, that have been created by statute, to be the result of 
professional groups' effecting new legislation to promote their own 
interests and not justified because they fail to meet the requisite con­
ditions. 129 Although Wigmore may not have intended his privilege 
analysis to be applied to statutory as well as common law privileges, 
numerous courts and commentators have utilized his requirements 
124. Id at 435,439 N.E.2d at 1230 (quoting People v. Lipsky, \02 Misc. 2d 19,24, 
423 N.Y.S.2d 599, 602 (1979)). 
125. WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 2285, at 527. 
126. Id 
127. Id (Emphasis in the original). 
128. Id § 2197, at 114. 
129. Id § 2286, at 532; Bernstein, Privileged Communications to the Social Worker, 
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to defend or attack the extension of a privilege to any given relation­
ship.130 An application of Wigmore's analysis to the facts of Collett 
would not support the extension of a privilege to the defendant in 
this case. 
A. WIGMORE'S REQUIREMENTS 
1. 	 The Communications Must Originate in a Co'!ftdence that 
They Will Not be J)isclosed 
Communications between the social worker and his or her client 
"often [involve] frank confessions of marital infidelities, homosexual 
relationships, business fraud or cheating, child abuse, or other confi­
dential or illegal acts."131 It is theorized that without an assurance of 
confidentiality, those in need of help will refrain from seeking it. 132 
Although there is no evidence to substantiate this premise, it is rea­
sonable to assume that individuals who reveal intimate details of 
their lives to any professional do so under an implied if not actual 
assurance that their communications will not be disclosed.133 The 
dissent in Collett 134 noted that a basis had not been established that 
would support an assumption that the social worker had implicitly 
or explicitly assured "any or all of her informants," including the 
defendant, that their disclosures would be held in confidence.135 
1977 SOCIAL WORK 264, 267 (suggesting the need for social workers to seek legislative 
recognition of a professional privilege). 
The National Association of Social Workers was the principal sponsor of the social 
worker-client privilege legislation which was incorporated into the social worker licens­
ing Act of 1977. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, §§ 130-37 (West 1983). Brief ofAmicus 
Curiae National Association of Social Workers, Massachusetts Chapter at I, Common­
wealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982). 
130. See, e.g., Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 417 (Alaska 1976); Perry v. Fiumano, 
61 A.D.2d 512, 517, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382, 385 (1978); State v. Martin, 274 N.W.2d 893, 895 
(S.D. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979); State v. Driscoll, 53 Wis. 2d 699,706, 193 
N.W.2d 851, 856 (1972); Bernstein, supra note 129, at 265; Berger, The Privileges Article in 
the New York Proposed Code ofEvidence, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1405, 1405-06 (1981); 
Note, The Social Worker- Client Relationship and Privileged Communications, 1965 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 362, 366, 384-87; Comment, Underprivileged Communications: Extension of the 
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege to Patients ofPsychiatric Social Workers, 61 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1050, 1056-58 (1973). 
131. Bernstein, supra note 129, at 264. 
132. Varon v. Varon, 83 Misc. 2d 276, 283-84, 372 N.Y.S.2d 518, 524-25 (1975); 
Note, supra note 130, at 385. 
133. If the client is informed that confidentiality will not be maintained, however, 
an implied assurance cannot exist and any existing privilege will be assumed to be 
waived. State v. Martin, 274 N.W.2d 893, 896 (S.D. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883 
(1979). 
134. 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (I982)(Lynch, J., dissenting). 
135. 	 Id. at 440, 439 N.E.2d at 1232-33. 
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Had the social worker explicity guaranteed confidentiality in order 
to elicit information from the defendant and others, then at least ar­
guably, this condition would be met. This was not the case, how­
ever, and therefore only an implied assurance of confidentiality 
would fulfill the requirement under the facts of Collet/. 
Although many jurisdictions have limited the scope of the social 
worker-client privilege to apply only to a "client" relationship or to 
communications originating within a therapeutic setting,136 it has 
been proposed that social worker relationships, unlike those of most 
other professionals, extend beyond the traditional "client" or "pa­
tient" boundaries. 137 When an individual consults a psychothera­
pist, for example, the revelations of "compulsions, fantasies, fears, 
obsessions, and guilt,"138 would not be disclosed without an expecta­
tion of confidence. 139 That an individual seeking the advice or coun­
sel of a social worker would hold a similar expectation of confidence 
would be a reasonable analogy. Social workers rarely treat an indi­
vidual client, however, particularly in cases of child abuse and ne­
glect. 140 More commonly, a social worker communicates with a 
whole network of "significant people" which, in addition to family 
members, may include clergy, physicians, teachers, neighbors and 
friends. 141 This network forms what is referred to as a "client sys­
tem."142 As stated by one author, "[i]n practice, the social worker's 
efforts involve sessions with more than just one client; contact with 
these other significant persons is equally dependent on the revealing 
of private information."143 
In Massachusetts, as in most other states, this "client system" 
approach is consistent with the policy expressed in the laws pertain­
ing to child abuse and neglect l44 which provide interventive, protec­
tive family counseling services to rehabilitate, rather than prosecute, 
abusive or neglectful parents or caretakers. 145 An implied, if not an 
explicit, guarantee of confidence would be deemed essential in order 
to obtain the information necessary for evaluation and treatment of 
these cases and thus promote the state's interest in preservation of 
136. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
137. Iaccarino, supra note 84, at 370. 
138. Comment, supra note 130, at 1057. 
139. Id. 
140. Iaccarino, supra note 84, at 370. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
145. Id. 
1984) SOCIAL WORKER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 1123 
family unity.146 
The majority in Collett 147 indicated an awareness of the social 
work practice within "client systems" by concluding that all of the 
social worker's informants were within the scope of the privilege be­
cause a "social worker's professional duties [in a case of suspected 
child abuse] would necessarily involve consulting with members of 
the victim's family and others closely connected to the victim's home 
situation."148 The dissent in Collett, however, argued that only those 
individuals who consult a social worker should have this expectation 
of confidence and not those with whom the social worker consults in 
the process of an investigation or evaluation. 149 Also, as the dissent 
noted, it is important to distinguish between the need for confidenti­
ality when a social worker is performing a counselling service, and 
"the myriad other investigative and administrative tasks performed 
by social workers."150 Thus, although the state's interest in main­
taining the integrity of families in cases of child abuse and neglect 
reasonably supports the expansion of an implied expectation of con­
fidence beyond the individual "client," extension of the protection of 
a privilege to all individuals who may only have a passing acquain­
tance with the child or the child's caretakers, seems unjustified. 
Generally, those individuals outside of the immediate family who 
disclose information regarding a victimized child do so to aid the 
social worker in diagnosing and treating the family.l5l Their disclo­
sures primarily include personal observations of the child and the 
family, and although these revelations may be a source of embar­
rassment to the child's family, they pose no similar threat to the ob­
server. Thus, although the "client system" concept adhered to by 
social worker's would justify an extension of confidentiality beyond 
the individual client, the extent that this concept can be expanded 
depends upon the task being performed by the social worker as it 
relates to the state's interest in encouraging individuals in need of 
assistance to secure social services. 
146. See, e.g., In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 386-87, 402 A.2d 169, 172-73 (1979); 
State v. Fagalde, 85 Wash. 2d 730, 736-37, 539 P.2d 86, 90 (1975). 
147. 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982). . 
148. Id at 429, 439 N.E.2d at 1227. 
149. Id at 440, 439 N.E.2d at 1232 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
150. Id at 441-42, 439 N.E.2d at 1233 (Lynch, J., dissenting). 
151. See BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 87, at 144-86, in which the au­
thors present a narrative of the case of Maria Colwell which includes documentation of 
efforts by neighbors and teachers to inform social service agencies of the child's maltreat­
ment by her stepfather. 
1124 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6: 1103 
2. 	 This Element of Confidentiality Must Be Essential to the 
Full and Satisfactory Maintenance of the Relation 
Between the Parties 
Social workers contend that confidentiality for communications 
between the social worker and his or her client is not only an ethical 
duty imposed by professional standards, but is essential to effective 
casework. 152 
The sharing of. . . secrets and confidences . . . and the as­
surance that they will remain confidential are necessary for the 
very performance of the [social worker's] services. 
Thus, the relationship between social worker and client gives 
rise to the duty of confidentiality, and the duty of confidentiality 
in tum gives rise to the relationship between social worker and 
client. Unless the client feels free to speak freely, the social 
worker's capacity to be helpful to him is severely limited. The 
social worker will not find out what he may need to know to be 
helpful to the client, and he will not have the client's confidence, 
which may be a prerequisite to the client's acceptance of the social 
worker's influence, guidance, authority, or whatever else the social 
worker may have to offer to help meet the client's need. 153 
The continuing need for confidentiality for communications 
with social workers, therefore, similar to Wigmore's first condition, 
focuses on the intended beneficiary of the social services. The need 
for confidentiality in all psychotherapeutic relationships has been 
recognized by courts and commentators as vital to the success of the 
therapy.154 The court in Collett 155 recognized this concept as support 
for the extension of the scope of the social worker-client privilege to 
all communications with social workers unless they fell within the 
exceptions. 156 Physicians, psychologists, and social workers, the 
court noted, "all share the common purpose of encouraging the pa­
tient or client to disclose the nature and details of his illness or his 
emotions without fear of later revelation by one in whom he placed 
152. 	 C. LEVY, SOCIAL WORK ETHICS 51-52 (1976); Bernstein, supra note 129, at 
266. 
153. LEVY, supra note 152, at 51-52. 
154. See, e.g., Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 417 (Alaska 1976); In re Lifschutz, 2 
Cal. 3d 415, 431, 467 P.2d 557, 567, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 839 (1970); Usen v. Usen, 359 
Mass. 453, 457, 269 N.E. 2d 442,444 (1971); Iaccarino, supra note 84, at 368; Comment, 
supra note 130, at 1057-58. 
155. 	 387 Mass. 424,439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982). 
156. 	 Id at 428, 439 N.E.2d at 1226. 
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his trust and confidence." 157 The court, however, refused to limit the 
scope of the privilege to therapeutic relationships absent a clear 
mandate from the legislature to do SO.15S 
At least one court, however, has indicated an unwillingness to 
recognize such a broad need for confidentiality for communications 
with social workers. A New York court, in In re Clear, 159 a proceed­
ing to terminate a mother's custody, held, inter alia, that the commu­
nications between the mother and the social worker in the course of 
multiple counselling sessions to "encourage and strengthen the pa­
rental relationship" were not privileged. '60 The court, using Wig­
more's analysis, stated that "there [was] no evidence as to the 
essentiality of confidentiality between the social worker and the 
mother, and no evidence [had] been submitted as to the character or 
the extent of the relationship between the social worker and the 
mother." 161 The court did not define the elements necessary to jus­
tify a need for confidentiality, but did note that in custody cases the 
welfare of the child was the primary interest of the state and to allow 
the protection of confidentiality for communications between the 
child's mother and the social worker would be contrary to that 
interest. 162 
In cases of child abuse or neglect, as has been noted, the state's 
interest is to maintain the integrity of the family.'63 This interest, 
therefore, would justify the need for confidentiality between the par­
ents or caretakers and the social worker, even though the child 
would be considered the primary beneficiary of the social services. 164 
But absent any prospective relationship among the child, the social 
worker and an informant, there is no justification for the extension 
of the protection of confidentiality. 165 In Collett, although the child's 
mother, a non-party to the action, would be within the parameters of 
157. Id (quoting Perry v. Fiumano, 61 A.D.2d 512, 516, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382, 384 
(1978». 
158. Id at 429-30, 439 N.E.2d at 1227. 
159. 58 Misc. 2d 699, 296 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. In 
re Klug, 32 A.D.2d 915, 302 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1969), on remand 65 Misc. 2d 323, 318 
N.Y.S.2d 876 (1970). 
160. 58 Misc. 2d at 700, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 186. 
161. Id at 702, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 187. 
162. Id at 702-03, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 187-88. 
163. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
164. People v. Easter, 90 Misc. 2d 748,753,395 N.Y.S.2d 926,930 (1977); D. BRIE­
LAND & J. LEMMON, SOCIAL WORK AND THE LAW 288 (1977). 
165. The social worker-client relationship, similar to other therapeutic relation­
ships, is built slowly on a foundation of trust. Iaccarino, supra note 84, at 367-68; Loui­
sell & Sinclair, The Supreme Court of California 1969-70, Foreward' Rejiections on the 
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the state's interest in extending confidentiality, no evidence was 
presented that would support the expansion of this protection to the 
defendant and others. 
3. 	 The Relation Must Be One Which in the Opinion ofthe 
Community Ought to Be Sedulously Fostered 
Social workers provide innumerable, valuable services to indi­
viduals, families, and groups which must be encouraged and sup­
ported not only because of the benefit derived by the direct 
recipients of the services but also because of the benefit conferred on 
the community as a whole. Social workers, as experts in family rela­
tions,166 are called upon to counsel a myriad of circumstances: mar­
ried couples in conflict; divorced parents in custody disputes; 
adolescents unable to adjust educationally, vocationally or socially; 
the unemployed; the unemployable; unmarried mothers; single par­
ents; childless couples; the abused and the abuser; the ill; the dying; 
and the bereaved. 167 The community benefits from social services 
that enable its citizens to improve the quality of their lives and be­
come useful members of the community.168 It is the expectation that 
a benefit will be derived by a social worker-client relationship, how­
ever, that merits the community's attention. If a relationship is not 
likely to result in a benefit to the recipient, then it does not meet 
Wigmore's condition as one which should be sedulously fostered by 
the community.169 
In Collett,11° although it would be assumed that any relation­
ship between an alleged abuser and a social worker would merit the 
encouragement of the community, the relationships among the social 
worker, the defendant and others fail to meet Wigmore's third condi­
tion. The social worker in Collett was employed by a private hospi­
tal to treat families of abused children admitted to that facility.l7l 
The defendant and some of the other nonparties to the action were 
not members of the victim's immediate family or household, but 
were sources of information for the social worker. Although the 
community would have an interest in promoting cooperation with 
Law ofPrivileged Communications - The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Perspective, 
59 CALIF. L. REV. 30, 52 (1971). 
166. 	 Bernstein, supra note 129, at 264. 
167. 	 Id; Note, supra note 130, at 385-86. 
168. 	 Note, supra note 130, at 386. 
169. 	 Id 
170. 	 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982). 
171. 	 Id at 426, 439 N.E.2d at 1225. 
1127 1984] SOCIAL WORKER·CLlENT PRIVILEGE 
social worker investigations, these individuals were not intended re­
cipients of the social services and, therefore, no relationship existed 
that would warrant the encouragement and support mandated by 
Wigmore's third requirement 
4. 	 The Injury that Would Inure to the Relation by Disclosure of the 
Communications Must be Greater than the Benefit Thereby 
Gainedlor the Correct Disposal ofLitigation 
Disclosures of client confidences by a social worker will obvi­
ously destroy the relationship and may serve to discourage those in 
need of help from seeking assistance. Regardless of the critical need 
for preservation of confidentiality in society's valued relationships, 
however, this interest must yield to serve the interests of justice in 
appropriate circumstances. The court in Collett recognized the need 
to effect a balance between conflicting state interests, but believed 
that this was a legislative function.172 State interests which were of 
overriding significance as compared to the need to protect confi­
dences, the court noted, had been promulgated by the legislature as 
exceptions to the statutory privilege. 173 Most states deny the social 
worker-client privilege if the communications reveal the contempla­
tion of a crime,174 if charges are brought against the social worker by 
the client,175 or if the privilege is waived by the client or the client's 
representative. 176 Fifteen states also limit the privilege and require 
the social worker to testify fully if the communications indicate that 
a minor was the victim of a crime. 177 Although the supreme judicial 
172. 	 Id at 428, 439 N.E.2d at 1226. 
173. 	 Id 
174. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. The right of the public to be 
warned of any threats to their safety or well-being has been held to be of overriding 
significance as compared to a need for confidentiality in a relationship. Tarasoff v. Re­
gents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,551 P.2d 334,131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). 
175. The exception allowing the social worker to defend against civil or criminal 
malpractice allegations is recognized in all jurisdictions. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 
III, § 6324(2) (Supp. 1983-84); N.Y. ClV. PRAC. § 4508(4) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83). 
176. The privilege belongs to the client and although under the statute it must be 
asserted by the social worker, it is done on behalf of the client. MCCORMICK, supra note 
6, at 152. As the owner of the privilege, the client has the power to waive the right. 
WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 2327. 
177. Illinois is the only state to abrogate the privilege by case law for cases involv­
ing a minor. People v. McKean, 94 Ill. App. 3d 502, 418 N.E.2d 1130 (1981). All other 
states have abrogated the privilege by statute. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-2815(c) (Supp. 
1983); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1027 (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-63.5-115(c) 
(1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 3913(3) (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 54-3213(3) 
(1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-5360(c) (1977); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 335.170(3) (Bobbs­
Merrill 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2714B(2) (West 1974); N.Y. ClV. PRAC. LAW 
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court believed that it was constrained by the language of the statute, 
other courts have recognized a need to balance conflicting state in­
terests on a case by case basis. 
The New York court, in In re Clear, 178 denied the protection of 
privilege for communications between a social worker and a mother 
in a proceeding to terminate parental custody. Although the mother 
had been counselled by the social worker for several years in an ef­
fort to improve the parental relationship, the court held, inter alia, 
that "disclosure of evidence relevant to a correct determination of 
whether the mother of an infant should be permanently deprived of 
its custody must be regarded as of far greater importance than any 
injury that might inure to the relationship between the social worker 
and the mother."179 In a more recent New York decision, the court 
similarly found that the state had an overriding interest in paternity 
determinations and refused to allow the protection of privilege for 
communications between the reputed father and a social worker. 180 
In a similar manner, an Illinois court,181 in the absence of an 
explicit exception to the social worker-client privilege, abrogated the 
protection for confidential communications in cases of child abuse in 
light of the legislative mandate that required social workers in the 
Department of Children and Family Services to investigate cases of 
child abuse to prevent further abuses to the child. 182 
Although the state undoubtedly has an interest in encouraging 
perpetrators of child abuse to seek assistance, the policies of the state 
which favor rehabilitation over prosecution of abusive family mem­
bersl83 cannot be stretched to include those who are strangers to the 
§ 4508(3) (McKinney 1982-83); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1272.1(3) (West Supp. 1983­
84); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.250(4) (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-26-30(3) (1977); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-35-10(3) (1974); VA. CODE § 8.01-400.2 (Supp. 1983). Similar to 
the Massachusetts statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135(e) (West 1983), a few 
jurisdictions also abrogate the privilege in custody proceedings. See, e.g., COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 12-63.5-115(3) (1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-5360(c) (1977); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 37:2714(C) (West 1974); see also In re Clear, 58 Misc. 2d 699, 296 N.Y.S.2d 184 
(1969), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. In re Klug, 32 A.D.2d 915, 302 N.Y.S.2d 418 
(1969), on remand 65 Misc. 2d 323, 318 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1970). 
178. 58 Misc. 2d 699, 296 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. In 
re Klug, 32 A.D.2d 915, 302 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1%9), on remand 65 Misc. 2d 323, 318 
N.Y.S.2d 876 (1970). 
179. 58 Misc. 2d at 703, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 188. See supra note 170 for jurisdictions 
abrogating the privilege by statute for custody proceedings. 
180. In re Humphrey v. Norden, 79 Misc. 2d 192, 359 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1974). 
181. People v. McKean, 94 Ill. App. 3d 502, 418 N.E.2d 1130 (1981); In re Pitts, 44 
Ill. App. 3d 46, 357 N.E.2d 872 (1976). 
182. In re Pitts, 44 Ill. App. 3d at 48-49, 357 N.E.2d at 874. 
183. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
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family as the basis for the protection of privilege. The need to prose­
cute the murder of a child to deter the future injury or death of other 
children must be considered a superior interest of the state which 
overrides any injury that may occur to the social worker-client 
relationship. 
In summary, only the first of Wigmore's four conditions is met 
by the defendant and other non-parties to the action in Collett. 
Therefore, no privilege is justified and full disclosure by the social 
worker should have been required. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The recently enacted social worker-client privilege statute, in 
the absence of clear documentation of legislative intent, presented 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court with an opportunity to 
exercise broad discretion in interpreting the statute in Commonwealth 
v. Collett. Although many courts and commentators have relied 
uron Wigmore's analysis to evaluate the extension of a privilege to 
certain relationships, the Massachusetts court did not consider this 
approach. The court was also reluctant to consider similar adjudica­
tions in other jurisdictions. Either alternative would favor a more 
narrow interpretation than was rendered by the supreme judicial 
court. The court's decision which broadly defined the scope of the 
social worker-client privilege, instead, offers maximum protection 
for communications between social workers and perpetrators or po­
tential witnesses of crimes against children. 
Under Wigmore's privilege analysis no privilege would be justi­
fied between the social worker and the defendant or others who were 
non-parties and unrelated to the victim in Collett. In the alternative, 
a recognition by the supreme judicial court of the rule in a majority 
of other jurisdictions, would support abrogating the privilege in all 
cases in which a minor was the victim of a crime. 
Although the court's opinion has been somewhat limited by re­
cent legislation which denies the use of privilege in cases in which a 
child has been seriously injured, raped, sexually assaulted or has 
died, the new law applies only to social workers employed by the 
state and, therefore, would have no effect on a future case with facts 
similar to Collett. 
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